WHAT'S KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT: Pertussis is a poorly controlled vaccine-preventable disease. Verifying outbreaks is challenging owing to nonspecific clinical presentations and imperfect diagnostic tests. Exclusive reliance on highly sensitive polymerase chain reaction has been associated with pseudo-outbreaks.
Despite high vaccination coverage, the United States has experienced a resurgence of pertussis, a highly infectious and outbreak-prone respiratory disease caused by the bacterium Bordetella pertussis. 1, 2 Clinical diagnosis is difficult, as early signs and symptoms are often nonspecific and laboratory diagnostics are imperfect. [3] [4] [5] [6] Culture is the gold standard, but the speed of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) has superseded culture. PCR methods are not standardized and few laboratories have defined their lower limits of detection, so positive cutoffs and reporting ranges vary. 3, 4 The highly sensitive nature of PCR means that extrinsic contamination of reagents, assays, or specimens with DNA can lead to false-positive results. 3, [7] [8] [9] This article describes the investigation of a respiratory illness outbreak that occurred in rural southwest Colorado from late November 2008 to August 2009. Clinics in a major population center were the main providers of health care for 3 contiguous counties (population 90 000). Elevated rates of disease were restricted to these 3 counties. The outbreak was attributed to B pertussis based on positive PCR results from clinical specimens collected largely from one clinic (Clinic A) and tested at a single laboratory (Laboratory A), a national diagnostic reference laboratory serving many states. The outbreak persisted despite appropriate control measures. Many cases reported prior pertussis vaccination and atypical symptoms. Efforts in July 2009 to confirm the outbreak by additional laboratory testing (PCR and serology) were inconclusive. We abstracted demographic, clinical, and immunization data from the state' s electronic disease-reporting system. We collected supplemental immunization and clinical symptom data through a questionnaire administered in person or by telephone interviews. Immunization status was verified using the state' s vaccine registry. A case was considered to be age-appropriately vaccinated if the case had documented receipt of pertussis vaccines as per the recommended schedule. 2, 11 To investigate whether there was any clustering of cases by clinic, the total number of PCR tests performed and the proportion positive at Laboratory A were obtained for providers who performed most of the specimen collection in the outbreak area.
METHODS
Confirmatory testing, including other respiratory pathogens, was performed at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Blood for serologic testing wasrequestedfrom caseswhose cough onset was 2 to 8 weeks before the interview. For cases coughing fewer than 2 weeks at interview, we requested blood, and a nasopharyngeal (NP) specimen for culture and PCR for Bordetella species, and PCR for human metapneumovirus, adenovirus, rhinovirus, parainfluenza virus 3, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, and Chlamydophila pneumoniae.
To assess the potential for laboratory contamination of NP specimens, Laboratory A provided any remaining frozen NP swabs in liquid transport medium from cases that had previously tested PCR positive. (NP swabs and liquid transport media were distributed by Laboratory A to providers as prepackaged kits.) These specimens were retested at CDC for Bordetella species and other respiratory pathogens. Uninoculated (sterile) NP swabs obtained from clinics were used as controls. To assess the validity and reliability of PCR at Laboratory A and potential for laboratory contamination, paired (ie, duplicate) testing was implemented from August 28, 2009, to September 4, 2009. NP aspirates from new cases of cough illness were split into 2 aliquots: one for CDC Bordetella PCR and culture and the other for Laboratory A Bordetella PCR. Specimens were collected, stored, and transported using identical methods. We also reviewed PCR data from Laboratory A, including standard operating procedures, PCR assay protocols, positivity rates over a 2-year period, including the outbreak months, and cycle threshold (Ct) values on outbreak cases. PCR Ct values are a quantification of the amount of DNA present in a specimen: low Ct values indicate large amounts of DNA and vice versa. NP aspirates were collected using N-Pak kits (M-Pro, Annandale, MN) and dispensed into sterile screw-cap tubes. Sterile rayon-tipped NP swabs (Copan Diagnostics, Murrieta, CA) were dipped into each aspirate and inserted into Regan-Lowe (RL) transport agar tubes (Remel, Lenexa, KS). For aspirate specimens on which paired testing was conducted, a second and third rayon-tipped swab were dipped into the aspirate and inserted into separate liquid universal transport media destined for CDC and Laboratory A. If aspirate collection was unsuccessful, an NP swab was taken and inserted into an RL transport tube.
NP specimens were plated onto RL agar plates with and without cephalexin and incubated for up to 10 days at 37°C. DNA was extracted by using the Roche Compact MagNAPure (Roche Applied Science, Indianapolis, IN). Real-time multitarget PCR assays were performed on the ABI ARTICLE 7500 (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA). 12 An NP specimen was considered to be positive for B pertussis if the Ct value was ,40 for both insertion sequence 481 (IS481) and pertussis toxin subunit 1 nucleic acid sequence targets. A Ct value $35 but ,40 for IS481 and negative for pertussis toxin subunit 1 was considered indeterminate. 12 A Ct value $40 on both targets was considered negative for B pertussis. 12 With CDC' s PCR assays, Ct values falling in the indeterminate or negative range are indicative of fewer than 1 bacterial genome. PCR testing for other respiratory pathogens (parainfluenza virus 3, human metapneumovirus, rhinovirus, adenovirus, C pneumoniae, and M pneumoniae) was performed on NP specimens with CDC in-house real-time PCR assays.
Serologicaltestingwas performed using an immunoglobulin G anti-pertussin toxin enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. 13 The diagnostic cutoff for recent pertussis infection was $94 IU/mL; values between 49 and 93 IU/mL were considered indeterminate, and values ,49 IU/mL were deemed negative. 14 To assess the potential for clinic contamination ofspecimens,2clinics agreed to participate in an environmental assessment, including Clinic A, which had the highest proportion of positive PCR results. Surveys were administered to the lead nurse onNP specimen collection practices; general cleaning; infectioncontrol procedures; room use for examination and vaccination; and storage, administration, and brands of pertussis vaccines. Clinic environmental sampling for B pertussis DNA was performed. Specimens were systematically collected from surfaces in exam rooms and nurses'stations. Sterile, flexible, flocked NP swabs (Copan) were wetted in a tube containing 500 µL of 10 mM Tris HCl, pH 8.0, sterile buffer and rubbed along surfaces with a twisting motion for 15 seconds before reinsertion into the tube. DNA extraction was by the Roche MagNAPure LC and testing followed CDC' s IS481 real-time PCR assay. 12 Statistical analysis was performed in SAS 9.2 for Windows (SAS Institute, Inc, Cary, NC). Differences between proportions were tested using Pearson' s x 2 tests or Fisher' s exact test, and differences between means were tested using the Student t test. The Wilcoxon test was used for nonparametric data.
Data were collected as part of a public health response and were determined to be nonresearch, thus not requiring institutionalreviewforprotectionofhuman subjects. Patient or parental informed consent was obtained for reference laboratory testing.
RESULTS
Over 9 months, 127 suspect cases were reported through routine surveillance and 26 additional suspect cases were enrolled via 3 provider offices. We completed questionnaires on 83 (65%) suspect cases from routine surveillance and 25 (96%) suspect cases identified through active case finding. In total, 125 cases (115 of 127 and 10 of 26) met the investigational outbreak case definition. The epidemic curve (Fig 1) Compared with the winter cases (n = 46), summer cases (n = 79) were less likely to report at least 1 classic pertussis symptom (63% vs 98%; P , .01) or cough for $14 days (70% vs 100%; P , .01), but more likely to have visited Clinic A (96% vs 67%; P , .01) and to have age-appropriate vaccinations (75% vs 57%; P = .05) ( Table 1 ). There was a decline in the monthly proportion of cases reporting paroxysms over the outbreak period (slope = 20.06; R 2 = 0.74; data not shown).
We looked at the distribution of PCRpositive results among providers in the outbreak area to see if this suggested a single source. During the outbreak period, 609 PCR tests were submitted to Laboratory A from providers. The proportion of PCR-positive results increased between winterand summer (6% to 34%; P , .01). Five providers requested 567 (93%) tests, of which a single provider, Clinic A, ordered the most tests (376/ 567, 66%), and had the highest overall proportion of positive results (21%), with a range of 4% to 67% over the outbreak Confirmatory testing at CDC was performed on specimens from 5 summer retrospective cases (5 sera) and 26 new cases of cough illness, providing 10 sera and 25 NP specimens (for culture and PCR). In addition, PCR retesting at CDC was performed on 14 Laboratory Apositive specimens from July 2009. At CDC, no specimens were positive for B pertussis by culture, PCR, or serology, but other respiratory pathogens were detected ( Table 2 ). The 9 indeterminate PCR results had similar Ct values on both Laboratory A' s and CDC' s PCR assays, but were reported differently: Laboratory A did not define an indeterminate range for Ct values indicating fewer than 1 bacterium, reporting these as "positive." These 9 indeterminate specimens comprised 7 retests of Laboratory A-positive specimens and 2 specimens from new patients on whom Clinic A staff used an NP swab and liquid transport medium, rather than an NP aspirate kit and semisolid transport medium.
Ct values on 85 PCR-positive specimens from clinics in the outbreak area between December 2008 and July 2009 were obtained from Laboratory A (Fig 3) . They grouped into a winter cluster with low Ct values (mean 33.1) and a summer cluster with a dramatic shift to high Ct values (mean 40.9); the difference in means was significant at P , .01. When CDC Ct cutoffs for determining positivity were applied, most winter cases fell into the positive range with summer cases falling in the indeterminate or negative range, suggestive of low levels of DNA (fewer than 1 bacterium) and possible contamination.
To investigate laboratory contamination, paired testing of NP specimens at CDC and Laboratory A was performed for 9 of the new cough illness cases described previously. Eight of the specimens, collected by using NP aspirate kits, were negative at both laboratories. One specimen was indeterminate at CDC but positive at Laboratory A, although the Ct values, and therefore the amount of DNA detected, were very similar: 39 at CDC and 40 at Laboratory A. This single indeterminate specimen differed from the other 8, having been collected by Clinic A staff using an NP swab and liquid transport medium. Four control liquid transport media tested negative for pertussis by CDC' s PCR. Laboratory A adherence to standard operating procedures likely minimized potential for within-laboratory contamination: culture was performed in a different laboratory from PCR, clean reagents were prepared in areas separate from DNA extraction and amplification, and negative controls were used after every 10 specimens (increased to every 6 specimens beginning July 2009). An environmental assessment was conducted at 2 clinics, A and B, to assess the potential for within-clinic specimen contamination. Both clinics used NP swabs and liquid transport media. During fall 2008, Clinic A switched to a diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis vaccine previously shown to contain B pertussis DNA. 15 Clinic A staff reported not routinely wearing gloves to collect NP specimens or to prepare vaccines, conducting examinations and vaccinations in the same rooms where hand-washing sinks were not always present, although alcohol-based hand sanitizers were, and not performing regular surface bleach cleanings. In Clinic B, in contrast, staff reported glove use for vaccination and specimen collection, sinks were present in all rooms, and periodic bleach cleanings occurred. Additionally, Clinic B used a vaccine in which B pertussis DNA has not been detected.
B pertussis DNA was widely detected on surfaces in Clinic A (11/18, 61% of sites swabbed) and its satellite clinic, A1 (3/9, 33% of sites swabbed), compared with fewer areas at Clinic B (2/20, 10% of sites swabbed). Large amounts of DNA (Ct value 33.2) were found on nurses' laptops in Clinic A and to a lesser degree (Ct value range 35.7-41.0) on vaccine refrigerator surfaces and examination room provider areas (worktops, sink areas, glove containers, biohazard bin, stool), patient areas (couch, toys, chairs), and doorknobs, with higher densities in an examination room without a sink. At the smaller satellite, Clinic A1, DNA was detected at the nurses' station, vaccine refrigerator, and doorknobs (Ct values 39.6-39.9). By comparison, a negligible amount of DNA (Ct value 41.0) was detected on 2 surfaces (doorknob and vaccine preparation area) in Clinic B. The environmental assessment indicated that spillage from preparation of diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis vaccines was the most likely source of high levels of DNA present on surfaces in Clinic A. Children sick with pertussis might have been an additional source, explaining the low levels detectedat Clinic B where vaccine containing B pertussis DNA was not reportedly used. We postulate that handling NP swabs without prior hand hygiene or putting on new gloves may have contributed to the transfer of environmental DNA to the swab handle. Following specimen collection, the inoculated swab and handle are inserted into a tube containing liquid transport media, and because this media freely circulates in the Pseudo-outbreaks and overestimation in true outbreaks associated with contamination in laboratories have previously been described. 3, 7 The role of environmentally present DNA in clinics is less well documented. 3, 16 Some acellular pertussis vaccines contain PCRdetectable B pertussis DNA 15 and both whole-cell and acellular vaccines have been implicated as a source of DNA on clinic surfaces. 9, 16 Although molecular typing has shown that this DNA can be linked to pertussis vaccines, insufficient DNA in our environmental specimens prevented us from demonstrating this. 9 Segregating examination and vaccination rooms has been suggested as a means of reducing opportunities for contamination of specimens with environmental DNA. 16 Clinic A reported initially using separate, designated rooms, which might explain why false-positive results did not present earlier, following the switch in vaccine brand. 
